This system represents a significant improvement on preceding designs it allows a larger surface area for hydrophone arrays, and thus greater array gains in passive mode compared to the older spherical array sonar configuration. The Kazan appears to be equipped with a conformal array comparable to that of the Lira sonar suite aboard the new Lada-class diesel-electric attack submarine (SSK). The difference in size here is likely accounted for by the fact that the Kazan fields a conformal array sonar, as opposed to the spherical MGK-600 Irtysh sonar suite on the Severodvinsk. The second major difference is the length between the bow and sail. In addition to compactness, the new-generation reactor will also contribute to the quieting of the submarine, meaning that the Kazan may surpass the Severodvinsk in terms of its ability to evade detection. The Severodvinsk used an older OK-650 series reactor. First, the incorporation of a fourth-generation KTP-6 monoblock reactor which does not have separate steam generators likely accounts for a 1.6-metre length difference between the missile compartment and the stern. In addition to a reduction in berthing spaces between the sail and missile compartment, two other design features have likely driven the size reduction. The sail length of the Yasen-M actually exceeds that of the Yasen by a small margin. Imagery analysis of the boat conducted by the authors and other analysts suggests that the primary differences between the two submarines are in the bow-to-sail and sail-to-missile compartment. This is consistent with the Kazan having a smaller crew than the Severodvinsk. Part of the reason for this is a reported four-metre reduction in berthing spaces on the vessel. The Yasen-M is about nine metres shorter than its predecessor. This will likely necessitate a change in how NATO manages the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) challenge in the High North, given that a strategy of barrier defence at the GIUK (Greenland–Iceland–UK) gap may actually do little to impact Russian submarines, which may have little need to traverse this barrier in order to achieve their operational ends. Long-range strike missions appear to be superseding sea lines of communication (SLOC) interdiction as a primary task. The shift from SSNs like the Akula, which are primarily optimised for a hunter-killer role, towards a concept closer to nuclear guided missile submarines (SSGNs), is likely indicative of a shift in the way that Russian submarines will contribute to future campaigns. As such, we might expect future submarines in this class to enter the fleet at a more rapid pace than previously envisioned.įrom a planning standpoint, the most notable feature of the Kazan – one which it shares with the Severodvinsk – is its capacity to launch a range of anti-ship and land attack missiles, including the hypersonic 3M22 Zircon. However, the design of the Kazan also evinces a number of evolutionary steps that should allow Russia to cut unit construction costs and build times for future vessels in the class. The slow pace of the latter project was in large part due to the financial troubles which beset Russia in the immediate post-Soviet era. The Kazan was constructed in eight years, less than half the time taken to construct the Severodvinsk. Nonetheless, the two boats share a number of characteristics, including a reported level of quietness comparable to the very best Western SSNs and a long-range strike capability which exceeds that seen on most Western assets.
It also appears to be shorter in length than its predecessor by about nine metres. The Russian Yasen-M-class nuclear cruise missile submarine (SSGN) Kazan was constructed to a shorter build time than the lead boat Severodvinsk.
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